Περίληψη
Πρόσφατα ο Φρέντερικ Μπάιζερ υποστήριξε τη θέση ότι η σύγχρονη συζήτηση για την κανονιστικότητα αναπαράγει τα προβλήματα της νεοκαντιανής συζήτησης, επειδή δεν τη λαμβάνει υπόψη της. Στόχος της διατριβής είναι να εξετάσει την επάρκεια της τρέχουσας «κανονιστικής πραγματολογίας» που επιστρέφει στον μετακαντιανό γερμανικό ιδεαλισμό για να συγκροτήσει μιαν έννοια κανονιστικότητας που να αντιμετωπίζει το πρόβλημα της «ακολούθησης κανόνων», δηλαδή, το πρόβλημα της άπειρης αναδρομής των κανόνων που ανακύπτει εν όψει της εφαρμογής εννοιολογικών κανόνων στην πραγματικότητα και συνδέεται από τον Καντ με την «κριτική δύναμη» (Μπράντομ, Πίπιν, Χάμπερμας). Για το σκοπό αυτό εξετάζω την πρόσληψη της Κριτικής της κριτικής δύναμης του Καντ από την «κανονιστική πραγματολογία» και αναδεικνύω την καταγωγή της – μέσω των Γκάνταμερ και Άρεντ – στην ormative Pragmatics” to return to post-Kantian German Idealism in order to develop a conception of normativity that can address the problem of “rule-following”, i.e., the problem of the infinite regress of rules that arises concerning the application of conceptual rules to reality and is known since Kant as the problem of “judgment” (Brandom, Pippin, Habermas). To achieve this aim Ι focus on the reception of Kant’s Critique of Judgment in “normative Pragmatics” and disclose its origin – via Gadamer and Arendt – in the reception of the Critique of Judgment within the neo-Kantian philosophy of language (Cohen, Cassirer). According to this interpretative continuum that concentrates on the transcendental principle of judgment, whose use is being referred by Kant at bottom to the “feeling of life” (beautiful) of the empirical human subjects in order to avoid the infinite regress, the problem of the Critique of Judgment lies consequently in its normative deficit concerning the practical dimension of “rule-following” (or “judgment”). In Chapter II Ι oppose this reception on the basis of an interpretation of the “double Aesthetics” (beautiful, sublime) of the Critique of Judgment. In particular I argue that Kant addresses the problem of naturalism through the second, “practical” principle of judgment that is being disclosed in the “Analytic of the Sublime”. In examining this principle I locate the real problem of the Critique of Judgment in the fact that the normative determination of the practical dimension of judgment marks the limit of the transcendental method, because it refers to a particular natural cause (the empirical human subject or the human “faculty of desire”) “that acts in accordance with concepts”. Thus this principle is not transcendental, but “metaphysical” and has within the “Critique” the irreducible status of “moral faith”. On this basis I claim that the “pragmatic transformation of Kant”, which is being proposed since Cassirer and up to “normative Pragmatics” as the appropriate correction, does not overcome the dialectic between naturalism and moral faith that characterizes Kant’s conception of normativity as regards the practical dimension of “judgment” (‘Dialectic of Judgment’). On the contrary it reproduces this dialectic, as it transforms due to an insufficient understanding of the real problem of the Critique of Judgment its “practical”, “metaphysical” principle. Finally in Chapter III I examine the question whether the ‘Dialectic of Judgment’ is a necessary conclusion and propose a reconstruction of the problem of “rule-following” and of the irreducible practical dimension of “judgment” as expression of the fundamental, modal distinction of transcendental philosophy between (conceptual) possibility and actuality. I follow thus the method of conceptual analysis from the perspective of critical philosophy in the Kantian tradition. According to the suggested reconstruction this distinction and the relevant problem does not refer only to human “understanding” or “judgment”, but to critical understanding in general. It is thus not a specifically human problem, but a structural element of rationality in general. On this basis I reconstruct precisely as expression of the fundamental transcendental modal distinction Cassirer’s use of the concept of “question” as logical form of “understanding” that reappears –also via Gadamer and Arendt– in “normative Pragmatics”, e.g. under the form of Brandom’s fundamental “practice of giving and asking for reasons”. As it thus refers to a strict transcendental principle (valid for rationality in general) the proposed reconstruction offers a conception of normativity (or rationality) that disentangles itself from the ‘Dialectic of Judgment’.
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